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Abstract 
 
With a mission to continue to support the goals of the International Space Station (ISS) and explore 
beyond Earth orbit, the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in 
the process of launching an entirely new space exploration initiative, the Constellation Program. Even 
as the Space Shuttle moves toward its final voyage, Constellation is building from nearly half a century 
of NASA spaceflight experience, and technological advances, including the legacy of Shuttle and earlier 
programs such as Apollo and the Saturn V rocket. Out of Constellation will come two new launch 
vehicles: the Ares I crew launch vehicle and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle. With the initial goal to 
seamlessly continue where the Space Shuttle leaves off, Ares will firstly service the Space Station. 
Ultimately, however, the intent is to push further: to establish an outpost on the Moon, and then to 
explore other destinations. With significant experience and a strong foundation in aerospace, NASA is 
now progressing toward the final design of the First Stage propulsion system for the Ares I. The new 
launch vehicle design will considerably increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of accessing 
space, and provide a viable growth path for human space exploration. To achieve these goals, NASA is 
taking advantage of Space Shuttle hardware, safety, reliability, and experience. With efforts to 
minimize technical risk and life-cycle costs, the First Stage office is again pulling from NASA’s strong 
legacy in aerospace exploration and development, most specifically the Space Shuttle Program. Trade 
studies have been conducted to evaluate life-cycle costs, expendability, and risk reduction. While many 
first stage features have already been determined, these trade studies are helping to resolve the 
operational requisites and configuration of the first stage element. This paper first presents an 
overview of the Ares missions and the genesis of the Ares vehicle design. It then looks at one of the 
most important trade studies to date, the “Ares I First Stage Expendability Trade Study.” The purpose 
of this study was to determine the utility of flying the first stage as an expendable booster rather than 
making it reusable. To lower the study complexity, four operational scenarios (or cases) were defined. 
This assessment then included an evaluation of the development, reliability, performance, and 
transition impacts associated with an expendable solution. This paper looks at these scenarios from the 
perspectives of cost, reliability, and performance. 
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Nomenclature 
 
BDM = Booster Deceleration Motor 
BTM = Booster Tumble Motor 
CaLV = Cargo Launch Vehicle 
CDF = Confined Detonating Fuse Line 
CDR = Critical Design Review 
CEV = Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CLV = Crew Launch Vehicle 
CM/LAS = Command Module/Launch Abort System 
 =  simulator) 
DAC = Design Analysis Cycle 
DDT&E = Design, Development, Test, and 
 = Evaluation 
DFI = Developmental Flight Instrumentation 
DM = Development Motor 
EDS = Earth Departure Stage 
ELP = Exploration Launch Projects 
ESAS = Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
FMEA = Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FITO = Flight and Integrated Test Office 
FS = First Stage 
FSE = Forward Skirt Extension 
FSM = Flight Support Motor 
FTS = Flight Termination System 
FWC = Filament Wound Case 
GSE = Ground Support Equipment 
ISS = International Space Station 
IS = Interstage 
JSC = Johnson Space Center 
KSC = Kennedy Space Center 
LAS = Launch Abort System 
LEO = low-Earth Orbit  
 
lbm = Pounds of Mass 
LOC = Loss of Crew 
LOM = Loss of Mission 
Max G = Maximum Gravity 
Max Q = Maximum Dynamic Pressure 
MEOP = Maximum Expected Operating Pressure 
Mlbf-sec = Million pounds of force per second 
MSFC = Marshall Space Flight Center 
mT = Metric Ton (Tonne) 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space 
 = Administration 
O&M = Operations and Maintenance 
OML = Outer Mold-line 
PBAN = Polybutadiene Acrylonitrile 
PFAR = Post-Flight Assessment Report 
PFI = Post Flight Inspection 
PRACA = Problem Assessment and Corrective 
 = Action  
PSA = Production Simulation Article 
psf = Pounds Per Square Foot 
psi = Pounds Per Square Inch 
psia = Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute 
RSRB = Reusable Solid Rocket Booster 
SRB = Solid Rocket Booster 
SRM = Solid Rocket Motor 
SSME = Space Shuttle Main Engine 
TLI = Trans-Lunar Injection 
TPS = Thermal Protection System 
TVC = Thrust Vector Control 
US = Upper Stage 
USE = Upper Stage Engine 
 
 
I.  Introduction: Ares Overview 
 
or the first time in over thirty years, NASA is developing a new fleet of human rated space flight vehicles. 
NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, has been assigned that mission. Tasked 
with delivering new crew and cargo launch capabilities, going not just to the Moon, but reaching further to build and 
explore from a lunar outpost, safely deliver a payload of crew and cargo to a specified ascent target and extend the 
boundaries of human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO). Reaching these goals, and expanding these 
capabilities will entail two separate missions:  
1) The crew and cargo will be separated into two separate vehicles: Ares I and Ares V (Figure 1) respectively. 
The Ares vehicles will seamlessly continue service to the International Space Station (ISS), transporting 
both people and payloads in a similar manner to, and as a direct continuation of, current Space Shuttle 
operations, which will be phased out as the new vehicles are phased in. 
2) In parallel with, and as part of the design of these new Ares vehicles, will be the delivery of new transport 
and crew exploration vehicles. The crew exploration vehicle, Orion, will have the capability to dock with 
both ISS and the Altair (the fleet’s new lunar lander), providing the ability to deliver both crew and cargo 
to the Moon and beyond. Equipped with a launch abort system, Orion will be capable of pulling its crew to 
safety in the event of an emergency on the launch pad or at any time during ascent. In addition to cargo, it 
will be able to deliver up to four crewmembers to the Moon’s surface, and serve as a base for exploration 
for up to a week, thereby providing the capability to explore further in subsequent lunar missions.  
F
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Figure 1.  Ares V cargo launch vehicle (left) and Ares I crew launch vehicle (right). 
 (NASA artist’s concept) 
 
II.  Design Overview 
The Ares I (Figure 2), which will be the first operational vehicle in the Ares fleet, consists of three major 
elements: a solid fuel first stage similar to a Shuttle reusable solid rocket booster (RSRB), an upper stage (US), and 
a liquid upper stage engine (USE). Based on the 4-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs) of the Space Shuttle 
Program, the new 5-segment solid rocket booster configuration will produce over 3.5 million pounds of thrust at 
liftoff and provide reliable propulsion technologies that reduce development costs for future space missions. The 
additional thrust will allow the vehicle to lift more weight and reach a higher altitude before the first stage separates 
from the upper stage, to propel the Orion into low-Earth orbit.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Ares I Launch Vehicle.  
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The Ares V (Figure 3) cargo launch vehicle’s propulsion system consists of a core stage and two boosters, which 
will be similar to those of the Ares I First Stage. With five commercial RS-68 engines (adapted from the Delta IV 
program) and the two five-segment solid rocket boosters, Ares V, which will begin full-scale development after the 
Shuttle’s retirement, will be the largest launch vehicle ever built and will generate over 10.5 million pounds of thrust 
at liftoff. Ares V will launch the Earth departure stage (EDS) into orbit, where it will await the launch and docking 
of an Orion crew vehicle before providing a trans-lunar injection (TLI) burn. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle.  
 
 
III.  Reusability Studies 
 
By using the same five-segment solid rocket boosters for Ares I and Ares V and a common solid motor design 
for both vehicles, data derived from the Ares I program can reduce the amount of effort required to prepare these 
boosters for the Ares V. While the legacy hardware is important, the Ares First Stage team is also upgrading the 
solid rocket boosters with state-of-the-art avionics, new hardware structures, and a redesigned nozzle. To that end, 
the First Stage office has conducted extensive expendability trade studies as part of life cycle cost evaluations. 
One of the more important studies to date was conducted to determine the utility of flying the first stage as an 
expendable booster rather than making it reusable. The overall objective of this study was, specifically, to perform a 
life cycle cost study to evaluate expendable vs. reusable Ares I First Stage and Ares V solid rocket boosters (SRBs). 
The study used a complex cost model that provided comprehensive data for the Ares Projects to make a reliable 
decision regarding this vehicle element. This assessment included an evaluation of development, reliability, 
performance, and transition impacts associated with an expendable solution. Additionally, there have been a number 
of evaluations looking at approaches to enhancing the overall performance improvements for Ares boosters as a 
block upgrade to support Ares V and lunar missions. 
To lower reusability study complexity, four operational scenarios, or cases, were defined. These included: Case 0, 
Case I, Case II, and Case III. The study participants then defined the hardware configurations, which allowed 
performance, cost, and reliability to be assessed. An evaluation of the individual cases was completed in the context 
of several key assumptions that are likely unique to this program. The most significant was that a substantial 
quantity of hardware already existed and therefore an initial procurement was not required. The individual cases are 
defined below. 
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IV.  The Cases  
A. Case 0 
Case 0 was the baseline reference case, which was to recover and reuse the first stage, which uses much of the 
current solid rocket booster legacy hardware; the Ares I hardware would be interchangeable with Ares V; Ares V 
would use legacy forward structures from the Space Shuttle inventory; and the solid rocket boosters would be 
recovered and inspected post flight and refurbished for a future flight. All other cases were associated with 
expendable configurations.  
B.  Case I 
Case I assumed that the Ares Projects would fly out the current metal part inventory and eventually replace it 
with new hardware of the same design. Booster tumble motors (BTMs) would be eliminated, as would recovery 
systems and the forward skirt extension, as well as pyrotechnic and recovery systems. These changes assume that 
there would be no recovery on the first or subsequent test flights. A Case I booster would have one-time-use 
avionics; be designed for ascent, but not reentry/splashdown; incorporate thermal protection systems (TPS) for 
ascent only; and have all systems used for reentry/splashdown and recovery removed. 
C.  Case II 
In Case II, solid rocket boosters would be recovered on the first seven flights in order to obtain post flight 
inspection (PFI) data and then convert to an expendable solution similar to Case I. It would maintain the outer mold-
line with the forward skirt extension to minimize vehicle data certification; and subsequent flights of Ares I and all 
flights of Ares V would use expendable booster hardware. Seven flights were chosen to provide sufficient data to 
evaluate internal insulation performance, namely to determine any flight-induced bias regarding insulation 
performance. All systems used for reentry/splashdown and recovery would be flown for the first seven flights. 
Under this case, Ares would fly out the existing metal hardware and replace it with new hardware of the same 
design. Hardware for the first seven flights is the same as Case 0 for reverse zero specific design items (e.g., thermal 
protection systems). 
D.  Case III 
Case III is a complement to Cases I and II. Case I would fly until the metal hardware inventory is expended and 
replaced with expendable hardware. This would amount to a block upgrade of the booster hardware. Such an 
upgrade would be designed for ascent, but not reentry/splashdown. The new design would make extensive use of 
composites on the forward structures, aft structures, and case cylinders. With the forward skirt extension and main 
parachute support system removed, the first stage booster would be shorter than its current configuration. However, 
for Ares V, the design change would not result in shortened core stage attach points. The important figures of merit 
used to judge expendability versus reusability are cost, reliability, and performance.  
This trade study was important because it encompassed the recurring and non-recurring life-cycle costs 
associated with facilities, ground support equipment (GSE), recovery ships, manufacturing, sustaining engineering, 
and refurbishment engineering. Table 1 depicts, at a high level, some of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
course of action. The most important disadvantage for expendability was the increased costs associated with 
hardware procurements. Those costs significantly exceeded the savings gained in facilities and operations.  
 
Table 1.  Advantages and disadvantages of expendability vs. reusability. 
 Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s) 
Reusable • Ability to evaluate hardware post-flight 
• Reduced hardware costs 
• Mass 
• Higher operating costs 
Expendable • Would not require parachutes or forward 
skirt extension – Mass  
• Booster tumble motors (BTMs) or 
thermal protection systems (TPS) not 
required – Mass  
• New hardware costs  
• Loss of post-flight data 
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 Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s) 
• Pyrotechnic events and hardware 
components reduced 
• Reduced operations 
 
V.  Cost 
The study developed and populated a cost model using Case I, Case II, and Case III information. Costs for Case 
0 were derived from the First Stage Element Office’s Program Planning and Budget Execution (PPB&E) submission 
and then converted into constant 2008 dollars. This data was then extended to match the 2040 life cycle cost mission 
model. Costs for Cases I, II, and III were captured in constant 2008 dollars and then measured against Case 0 to 
determine any deltas (changes) from Case 0. Data included: 
• Hardware costs. 
o Proposal values for new hardware, escalated actuals for legacy. 
o Filament wound case based on Titan costs. 
• Non-recurring cost for hardware vendor certification and delta qualification. 
o ATK and USA provided. 
• KSC and Clearfield facility operations and maintenance (O&M) and ground support equipment (GSE) cost 
reductions. 
o Florida facility inputs from KSC budget estimates. 
• Recovery ships operations, maintenance, training and periodic dry dock. 
o Actuals. 
• Post-flight inspection cost elimination.  
o Touch labor, safety and quality. 
o Actuals. 
• Design Engineering reduction costs. 
o Refurb and post-flight issue dispositioning. 
o Refurb touch.  
 
The cost model did not include: 
• Economic value for performance increase. 
• Transfer of cost deleted from first stage to other NASA projects for ships and Hangar-N (at KSC). 
 
Case 0 proved to be the most effective alternative in the cost evaluation process for this specific situation. Cases 
I and II were the next-most cost-effective alternatives, and their total new equipment costs outweighed any facility 
cost savings by nearly a two-to-one margin, with increased costs measuring in the billions. Case III was less 
affordable than Cases I and II.  
 
A.  Costs Summary  
Cumulative delta cost savings realized from elimination of recovery/refurb facilities, tooling, labor, engineering 
through 2018 timeframe include the cost of replacement hardware overcomes savings in the 2018 timeframe. The 
lifecycle delta cost increase is several billion dollars for expendability solutions. Consequently, if cost is the driving 
requirement, then the reuse solution has the lowest lifecycle cost through 2038. 
 
VI.  Reliability 
To evaluate the potential impacts on first stage reliability, post-flight evaluation data from 1988 through 2007 
was evaluated along with current Shuttle Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) database. The post-flight data 
(Figure 4) proved to be the most useful in determining the potential reliability impact to an expendable solution.  
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Figure 4.  RSRM Post Flight Assessment Report Trend. 
 
By looking back, filtering the data through a series of questions, the first stage team was able to see how many 
critical performance issues may have had the potential to propagate to a booster failure. See Figure 5 for the 
screening methodology.5 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  RSRM Post-Flight Assessment Report (PFAR) Screening Process. 
 
                                                          
5The process began (upper left corner of the figure) with all the initial post flight inspection (PFI) data found in Post Flight 
Assessment Reports (PFAR). These reports were then screened against the criteria for entering the data into NASA’s problem 
tracking system, PRACA, the Problem Assessment and Corrective Action System. A total of 1124 PFARs were evaluated against 
the PRACA reporting criteria. These 350 screened PRACA reports were then grouped into two categories:  
1. PRACA reports closed by explanation - the item is understood to have no significant change in risk to flight; 
2. PRACA reports closed by corrective action - the risk level warranted a change to the hardware and/or process. 
This screening step found a total of 96 (updated) reports to have been closed by corrective action. These reports were then further 
evaluated for potential catastrophic effect of the problem on the vehicle, called Crit 1 in the NASA community, had the RSRM 
not been recovered to allow PFI and problem discovery. (Safie) 
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 By determining the number of potential Crit 16 anomalies, probabilistic analyses could be performed. These data 
are presented in the following two tables.  
 
Table 2.  Crit 1 Items = 1, First Stage Impact 6.5%. 
TPM 
First Stage Ares I 
Requirement 
Estimates 
Requirement
Estimates 
Case 0 Case I Case 0 Case I 
LOM 1/1,675* 1/1,200* 1/1,126 1/500* 1/358* 1/351 
LOC 1/11,000 1/8,000 1/7,510 1/3,200 1/2,386 1/2,339 
 
 
Table 3.  Reliability Results: Crit 1 Items = 2, First Stage Impact 13%. 
TPM 
First Stage Ares I 
Requirement 
Estimates 
Requirement
Estimates 
Case 0 Case I Case 0 Case I 
LOM 1/1,675* 1/1,200* 1/1,062 1/500 1/358* 1/344 
LOC 1/11,000 1/8,000 1/7,000 1/3,200 1/2,386 1/2,294 
 
 
The reliability decrease with an expendable design (due to loss of post-flight data) was assessed to be between 
6.5 and 13 percent. The post-flight data analyses were useful in categorizing the items typically seen, such as design 
causes, manufacturing causes, supplier causes, and processing causes. These 350 PRACA reports are graphed in 
Figure 6 and presented in pie chart format in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
6A critical, level 1 failure, which could result in loss of mission (LOM) or loss of crew (LOC). 
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Figure 6.  RSRM Post Flight Assessment Report Causes by Category.7 
 
 
 
 
 
It is apparent in these data, that many of the 
issues regarding first stage performance anomalies 
have been significantly reduced over time. This 
trend demonstrates the robustness and maturation 
of this large solid rocket motor, giving first stage 
designers confidence in their ability to create a 
five-segment design drawing on over 20 years of 
post-flight assessment. 
Hazard impacts were evaluated based on 
current Shuttle solid rocket booster failure modes 
and effects analysis (FMEA) hazards. These data 
were evaluated to determine which failure modes 
could be eliminated with the elimination of 
deceleration, recovery, and reuse design items. 
Most of the reduction in failure modes was 
attributed to pyrotechnic “fail to fire” or 
“premature fire” of these systems. By eliminating 
these failure modes, the total reduction in first 
stage Crit 1 failure modes equaled 21 percent, a 
seemingly large number. However, due to the high 
reliability of such systems, the overall effect on first stage reliability was insignificant. An example of a potential 
Crit 1 failure is shown in Table 4.8 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7The spike that appears on the right of the charts is a result of changing inspection ground rules due to the Columbia 
accident.  
 
8The pocket erosion on the reusable solid rocket motor throat and forward exit cone described in Table 4 occurred during 
pre-Challenger years and then again in 1996 on reusable solid rocket motor-56B, which was flown on Space Shuttle flight 79. 
Later it was observed in 2001 during static testing. Nozzle composite parts have demonstrated a high sensitivity to change over 
the years. The cause for the pocketing was attributed to an oven at a second tier supplier. Processing creep, the unintended and 
unobserved change in critical process parameters over time, occurred with the oven, which led to the pocketing. Without post 
flight evaluation, the probability of detection for this issue would have been extremely low. 
 
Figure 7.  RSRM Post Flight Problem Assessment and 
Corrective Action Reports by Category. 
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Table 4.  Example of a Potential Crit 1. 
 
STS FLT Date RSRM Title Summary 
79 79 9/16/1996 56B 
Abnormal 
Carbon 
Phenolic 
Erosion Pattern 
on Nozzle 
Throat Ring and 
Forward Exit 
Cone, RSRM-
56B* 
SPR 292, RSRM-56B pocket erosion on the 
throat and forward exit cone CCP (and 
erosion/char margin of safety violations) may be 
attributed to ply-angles and wrinkles in throat aft 
end. RSRM-49 also had pocket erosion on the 
throat and FEC (and erosion/char margin of safety 
violations). Minor pocketing was also reported on 
RSRM-57B. See deviation RDW-0652. Adequate 
margins of safety allow for pocketing. A spacer 
augmented mandrel - allows for overstock and 
removal of any ply distortions - was incorporated. 
Plasma torch test bed (PTTB) sampling of aft tag 
ends and laser hardening material evaluation tab 
(LHMEL) tests - when necessary -- help prevent 
phenoloic material that may have a higher 
propensity to pocket. See PAS 301. 
 
 
The team also evaluated impacts to ground hazards and the potential for reducing them through expendability. 
These hazards included dangers to the ground crew during recovery; shipboard incidents; and refurbishment hazards 
at KSC and ATK Launch Systems facilities such as processing hazards related to pyrotechnic and other recovery 
hardware.  
B. Reliability Summary 
PFA screening found one item that could have propagated to Crit 1 if left unattended. The corresponding 
calculated decrease on first stage reliability is 6.5 percent, from 1 chance in 1,200 to 1 in 1,126 for loss of mission 
(LOM). A significant number of design issues were corrected as a result of post-flight findings. By going with an 
expendable booster, a total of 81 (21 percent) Crit 1 failure modes could be eliminated from the nozzle, separation, 
deceleration and recovery subsystems; these included low-probability events with insignificant affect on reliability 
calculations. Ground hazards were reduced by eliminating recovery, refurbishment, and processing. There was a 
new hazard with potential shipping lane debris. Filament wound case (FWC) hazards need detailed assessment. 
Given the maturity of the solid rocket booster (in great part due to the benefits gained from 30 years of 
inspection), and given that the design modifications for Ares First Stage will be certified via static test, post-flight 
data alone does not justify recovery. Current Ares design changes can be adequately evaluated with a robust ground 
static test program. Increased developmental flight instrumentation (DFI) will provide a marginal impact on 
performance understanding: Flight bias on insulation performance. Increased ground testing, process control, 
material fingerprinting, etc., will have greater impact on reliability. 
In essence, it was concluded that some reliability impacts would result from losing post-flight inspection data 
but that the decision regarding expendability was driven mostly by the lifecycle cost and need for performance. 
 
VII.  Performance 
A Systems Panel Team performed vehicle performance calculations concentrating on the amount of additional 
payload Ares I and Ares V could carry to low-Earth orbit (LEO) in each of the primary three cases. A brief 
discussion of each of the configurations, weight changes, and payload performance of those three cases follow: 
(Blackwell) 
 
A.  Ares I, Case I Performance Study: 
There is a payload gain opportunity if the Ares I First Stage is not designed for recovery and the hardware 
components required for recovery and reusability of the first stage are removed. The current Ares I First Stage 
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design is configured for recovery of the first stage booster hardware after launch. The booster hardware is recovered, 
cleaned for shipment at Hangar AF, and re-furbished for re-use at ATK or KSC. The forward skirt extension 
assembly is removed and the first stage outer mold-line (OML) is shortened. This option is viable if the Ares I 
vehicle can accommodate the increased dynamic pressure and accelerations during first stage flight due to the lighter 
vehicle. The first stage weight change for expendability is estimated to be 22,300 pounds less than the recoverable 
variant. The weights are based on an analysis by ATK, the Ares First Stage team, Ares, and Shuttle reusable solid 
rocket booster projects. The first stage motor type hardware weighs 3,110 pounds less and the non-motor type 
hardware is 19,190 pounds less. The Ares I ascent performance change is estimated at 2,100 pounds more. The 
change in maximum dynamic pressure is estimated to be an increase of 21 pounds per square foot.  
 
B.  Ares I, Case II Performance Study: 
There is a potential payload gain opportunity if the Ares I first stage is not recovered on “selected” flights and 
the hardware components required for recovery and reusability of the first stage are removed. The forward skirt 
extension assembly is not removed to maintain the first stage outer mold-line. If recovery is desired, the hardware 
may be re-installed. If recovery is selected, there is zero change to performance. The “selected recovery” option is 
viable if the Ares I vehicle can accommodate the increased dynamic pressure and accelerations during first stage 
flight. The first stage weight change for “selective recovery” is about 16,910 pounds less. The weights are based 
upon an analysis by ATK, the Ares First Stage team, Ares, and Shuttle reusable solid rocket booster projects. The 
first stage motor type hardware is 3,110 pounds less and the non-motor type hardware is 13,800 pounds less. The 
Ares I ascent performance change is estimated at 1,600 pounds more. The change in maximum dynamic pressure is 
estimated as a 16 pound per square foot increase.  
 
C.  Ares I, Case III Performance Study: 
There is a larger payload gain opportunity if the Ares I First Stage is not designed for recovery and the current 
first stage hardware components are redesigned for performance. The first stage weight is reduced by replacing part 
of the steel case components with graphite composite components. The forward skirt extension assembly is removed 
and the first stage outer mold-line is shortened. This option is viable if the Ares I vehicle can accommodate the 
increased dynamic pressure and accelerations during first stage flight due to the lighter vehicle. The first stage 
weight change is estimated to be 58,920 pounds less. The weights are based upon an analysis by ATK, the Ares First 
Stage team, Ares, and Shuttle reusable solid rocket booster projects. The first stage motor type hardware is 39,710 
pounds less and the non-motor type hardware is 19,210 pounds less. The weight change estimate is derived 
assuming no mass growth allowance. The Ares I ascent performance change is estimated as 5,550 pounds greater. 
The change in maximum dynamic pressure is estimated at a 56 pound per square foot increase. 
 
D.  Ares I, Cases I, II, and III Performance Increase – Case Maximum Expected Operating Pressure (MEOP) 
Increase: 
For the three Ares I cases, there is an additional potential payload gain opportunity if the first stage is not 
recovered for reuse and a higher propellant burn rate is selected. The first stage steel case MEOP may be raised to 
1,066 pounds per square inch absolute from 1,016 pounds per square inch absolute if only used for one flight. This 
increase allows the propellant burn rate to be increased by about 10.4 mills. This option is viable if the Ares I 
vehicle can accommodate the increased dynamic pressure and accelerations during first stage flight. The Ares I 
ascent performance change is estimated as 2,010 pounds greater. The change in maximum dynamic pressure is 
estimated as an 80 pound per square foot increase. 
E.  Ares V, Case I Performance Study: 
There is a payload gain opportunity if the Ares V first stage is not designed for recovery and the hardware 
components required for recovery and reusability of the first stage are removed. The First Stage outer mold-line is 
unchanged. This option is viable if the Ares V vehicle can accommodate the increased dynamic pressure and 
accelerations during first stage flight due to the lighter vehicle. The first stage weight change is estimated to be 
15,810 pounds less. The weights are based upon an analysis by ATK, Ares First Stage Project, Ares Project, and 
Shuttle reusable solid rocket booster project. The first stage motor type hardware is 2,960 pounds less and the non-
motor type hardware is 12,850 pounds less. The Ares V ascent performance change is estimated as 2,720 pounds 
more. The change in maximum dynamic pressure is estimated as a 6 pound per square foot increase. 
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F.  Ares V, Case III Performance Study: 
There is a larger payload gain opportunity if the Ares V First Stage is not designed for recovery and the current 
first stage hardware components are redesigned for performance. The first stage weight is reduced by replacing part 
of the steel case components with graphite composite components. The forward skirt assembly is redesigned and the 
first stage outer mold-line is changed. This option is viable if the Ares V vehicle can accommodate the increased 
dynamic pressure and accelerations during first stage flight due to the lighter vehicle. The first stage weight change 
is estimated to be 56,270 pounds less. The weights are based upon an analysis by ATK, the Ares First Stage team, 
Ares, and Shuttle reusable solid rocket booster projects. The first stage motor type hardware is 39,560 pounds less 
and the non-motor type hardware is 16,710 pounds less. The weight change estimate is derived assuming no mass 
growth allowance. The Ares V ascent performance change is estimated as 9,700 pounds more. The change in 
maximum dynamic pressure is estimated as a 20 pound per square foot increase. 
 
G.  Ares V, Cases I, and III Performance Increase – Case Maximum Expected Operating Pressure (MEOP) 
Increase: 
For both cases, there is an additional potential payload gain opportunity if the first stage is not recovered for 
reuse and a higher propellant burn rate is selected. The first stage steel case MEOP may be raised to 1,066 pounds 
per square inch absolute (psia) from 1,016 pounds per square inch absolute if only used for one flight. This increase 
allows the propellant burn rate to be increased by about 10.4 mills. This option is viable if the Ares V vehicle can 
accommodate the increased dynamic pressure and accelerations during first stage flight. The Ares I ascent 
performance change is estimated as 6,380 pounds more. The change in maximum dynamic pressure is estimated as 
an increase of 50 pounds per square foot. 
 Vehicle performance calculations were completed by the Systems Panel Team. Tables 5 and 6 depict these 
predicted results. 
 
Table 5.  Potential performance increases for Ares I based on the three cases. 
Case 
Additional Payload 
(pounds of 
mass/lbm) 
Delta in Maximum Dynamic 
Pressure (pounds per square 
foot/psf) 
I 2,100 +21 
II 0 and 1,600 +16 
III 5,550 +56 
 
Notes: 
• Additional performance potential is possible with a maximum expected operating pressure (MEOP) 
increase from 1,016 pounds per square inch (psi) to 1,066 pounds per square inch. The MEOP increase 
would be allowable because the hardware would not be reused in Cases I-III. 
• Addition of 2,010 pounds of mass for Cases I, II, III (delta max Q = 136 pounds per square foot).  
 
Table 6.  Potential performance increases for Ares V based on the three cases. 
Case 
Additional Payload 
(pounds of 
mass/lbm.) 
Delta in Maximum Dynamic 
Pressure (pounds per square 
foot/psf) 
I 2,725 +6 
II N/A N/A 
III 9,700 +20 
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Notes: 
• Case II stipulated a gradual ramp-up toward expendable hardware as a block upgrade for Ares I. In the case 
of Ares V, expendable hardware would be used from the start; thus, Case II was not included as a scenario 
for Ares V. 
• Additional performance potential is possible with a MEOP increase from 1,016 pounds per square inch to 
1,066 pounds per square inch. The MEOP increase would be allowable because the hardware would not be 
reused in Cases I and III. 
• Addition of 6,380 pounds of mass for Cases I and III (delta max Q = +70 pounds per square foot). 
 
H.  Performance Summary 
The performance difference between Case I and Case III was 2,100 to 5,550 pounds of mass (lbm) respectively 
for Ares 1, depending on the expendability design solution. There was a 2,725 to 9,700 pounds of mass performance 
increase between Case I and Case III for Ares V depending on the expendability design solution. Consequently, if 
performance is the driving requirement, then expendability provides significant performance benefits:  
• 2,100 to 5,500 pounds of mass for Ares I. 
• 2,725 to 9,700 pounds of mass for Ares V. 
 
VIII.  Reusability Studies Conclusion 
 
If cost is the only determining factor, the Ares First Stage reusability study provided enough data for the Ares 
Projects to make a reliable decision regarding this vehicle element. The most important finding was that it is not life-
cycle-cost effective to adopt expendable over reusable Ares I first stage and Ares V boosters. This solution is driven 
by the need for performance. However, if performance remains an issue for Ares I and V, then expendability 
provides measurable performance benefits, albeit at significant cost to the project. 
• 2,100 to 5,500 pounds of mass for Ares I. 
• 2,725 to 9,700 pounds of mass for Ares V. 
 
The effect of the absence of PFI data does not drive this decision; however, it will have a small affect on first 
stage reliability. The assessment is subjective in evaluating Crit 1 hazard propagation and does not include 
combination interactions. With an expendable solution, the First Stage Element Office would need to conduct the 
following activities to reexamine the issue and ensure booster quality and safety: 
• Increased manufacturing and operations inspection and surveillance, material finger printing (quality 
tracking), etc. 
• Increased numbers and extremes on static testing. 
 
With this study completed, the Ares First Stage team is moving forward with its plans to reuse the solid rocket 
boosters as part of NASA’s continuing commitment to safe, reliable, and affordable space transportation activities. 
_____________________________ 
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Abstract 
 
With a mission to continue to support the goals of the International Space Station (ISS) and 
explore beyond Earth orbit, the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) is in the process of launching an entirely new space exploration initiative, the 
Constellation Program. Even as the Space Shuttle moves toward its final voyage, Constellation 
is building from nearly half a century of NASA spaceflight experience, and technological 
advances, including the legacy of Shuttle and earlier programs such as Apollo and the Saturn 
V rocket. Out of Constellation will come two new launch vehicles: the Ares I crew launch 
vehicle and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle. With the initial goal to seamlessly continue where 
the Space Shuttle leaves off, Ares will firstly service the Space Station. Ultimately, however, 
the intent is to push further: to establish an outpost on the Moon, and then to explore other 
destinations. With significant experience and a strong foundation in aerospace, NASA is now 
progressing toward the final design of the First Stage propulsion system for the Ares I. The 
new launch vehicle design will considerably increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of 
accessing space, and provide a viable growth path for human space exploration. To achieve 
these goals, NASA is taking advantage of Space Shuttle hardware, safety, reliability, and 
experience. With efforts to minimize technical risk and life-cycle costs, the First Stage office is 
again pulling from NASA’s strong legacy in aerospace exploration and development, most 
specifically the Space Shuttle Program. Trade studies have been conducted to evaluate life-
cycle costs, expendability, and risk reduction. While many first stage features have already 
been determined, these trade studies are helping to resolve the operational requisites and 
configuration of the first stage element. This paper first presents an overview of the Ares 
missions and the genesis of the Ares vehicle design. It then looks at one of the most important 
trade studies to date, the “Ares I First Stage Expendability Trade Study.” The purpose of this 
study was to determine the utility of flying the first stage as an expendable booster rather than 
making it reusable. To lower the study complexity, four operational scenarios (or cases) were 
defined. This assessment then included an evaluation of the development, reliability, 
performance, and transition impacts associated with an expendable solution. The paper looks 
at these scenarios from the perspectives of cost, reliability, and performance. The presentation 
provides an overview of the paper. 
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Introduction: NASA and Ares
♦With a mission to continue in its service to the goals and 
support of the International Space Station, NASA is in the 
process of launching an entirely new space exploration 
initiative a new fleet of space exploration vehicles
Orion
Crew Exploration
VehicleAres V
Cargo Launch
Vehicle
Earth 
Departure 
Stage
,        
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Altair
Lunar
Lander
Ares I
Crew Launch 
Vehicle
The Ares V and Ares I
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Ares I 
First Stage
• Derived from current Shuttle 
RSRM/BOrion CEV
Instrument Unit
Encapsulated Service
Module (ESM) Panels
Upper 
Stage
• Five segments/Polybutadeine 
Acrylonitrile (PBAN) propellant
• Recoverable
• New forward adaptor
• Avionics upgrades
• ATK Launch Systems 
Prime Contractor
 
Interstage
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Upper Stage 
Engine
Ares I First Stage Overview
♦Legacy motor casings, 
aft skirt
♦New forward structures
• Forward Skirt 
• Forward Skirt Extension
• Aeroshell
• Frustum
♦Metal and composite materials
♦Shuttle-derived five-segment 
solid rocket motor
• Increased performance
• Extensibility to Ares V
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First Stage Expendability Introduction
♦Objective – Perform a life cycle cost 
study to evaluate expendable vs. reuse      
of the Ares I First Stage and Ares V Solid 
Rocket Boosters. 
♦This assessment will include an 
evaluation of the technical impacts in 
development, reliability, performance 
and transition of an expendable vs. 
bl fi t t l ti
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reusa e rs  s age so u on
Study Cases
♦Case 0  
• Baseline reference case
• Recover and reuse 
• Ares I hardware interchangeable with Ares V
H it f d t t f A V− er age orwar  s ruc ures or res 
♦Case I 
• Fly out current hardware and replace with current design
• Modified design for expendability
− No chutes, no fwd. skirt extension, no booster tumble motors, etc.
♦Case II
• Recover for 7 flights
• Driven by potential need for insulation flight performance  bias
• Maintain outer mold line (fwd skirt extension = 5394 lbm) to minimize
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
            
vehicle delta certification
♦Case III
• Hardware with design for expendable application
• Implement for Ares V with block change on Ares I when first metal part 
runs out
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Reusable vs Expendable Manifest
PPBE 09 Ares I and Ares V First Stage Flights and FSMs           
FY08FY09FY10FY11FY12FY13FY14FY15FY16FY17FY18FY19FY20FY21FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26FY27FY28FY29FY30FY31FY32FY33FY34FY35FY36FY37FY38FY39FY40Tota
Ares I Flights 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 62
Ares V Flights 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 45
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Reusability Studies Presentation 08/07
6
Cost Model
♦ Cost model developed and populated with Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 
information
• Hardware Costs
− Proposal values for new hardware, escalated actuals for heritage, learning curve applied 
to account for high rate production (reduces average unit cost by 20-25%)
− FWC based on Titan costs escalated to FY08 constant dollars
• Non-recurring cost for hardware vendor certification and delta qualification
− ATK and USA provided
• KSC and Clearfield facility O&M and GSE cost reductions
− Florida facility inputs from KSC budget estimates
• Recovery ships operations, maintenance, training and periodic dry dock 
− Actuals
• Elimination of refurbishment labor costs (Touch labor, Support and Quality)
− KSC (eliminated for Hanger A-F, Hanger N, and PRF)
− ATK (reduced Clearfield refurbishment substantially)
− 100 percent reduction of touch and support for refurbishment at KSC and 45 percent 
d ti f t h d t f f bi h t t ATK t li i t d t
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
re uc on o  ouc  an  suppor  or re ur s men  a  , canno  e m na e ue o case 
hardware acceptance at Clearfield
− Based on KSC and ATK  budget estimates
• Design Engineering reduction costs
− Refurb and postflight issue dispositioning
− 20 percent reduction of total engineering at USA and ATK
• Cost model does not include
− Economic value for performance increase
− Transfer of cost deleted from First Stage to other NASA projects for Ships 
and Hanger-N
Cost Results
Note:  The delta cost for Cases 1, 2 and 3 is 
from the First Stage baseline budget 
(Reusable)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Case 1 Total Cost Savings and Cost Increases
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and Cost Increases
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(0.40)
Elimination of development work Delta in ATK Engineering, Touch and Quality Hours
Facilities Reductions Tooling Reductions
Ships reductions Production/Processing Labor Reductions
Post-Flight/Refurb Engineering Reductions Post-Flight/Refurb Touch, Support & QA Reductions
Vendor Refurb/Hardware Reductions Added Hardware Cost 
Added Mitigation Cost Added cost for hardware vendor tooling/requal
Added modification work to existing hardware
Case 2 Total Cost Savings and Cost Increases
0 94
Case 2 Total Cost Savings 
and Cost Increases
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Elimination of development work Delta in ATK Engineering, Touch and Quality Hours
Facilities Reductions Tooling Reductions
Ships reductions Production/Processing Labor Reductions
Post-Flight/Refurb Engineering Reductions Post-Flight/Refurb Touch, Support & QA Reductions
Vendor Refurb/Hardware Reductions Added Hardware Cost 
Added Mitigation Cost Added development work
Added modification work to existing hardware
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Case 3 Total Cost Savings and Cost Increases
Case 3 Total Cost Savings 
and Cost Increases
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Facilities Reductions Tooling Reductions
Ships reductions Production/Processing Labor Reductions
Post-Flight/Refurb Engineering Reductions Post-Flight/Refurb Touch, Support & QA Reductions
Vendor Refurb/Hardware Reductions Added Hardware Cost 
Added Mitigation Cost Added  Expendable Design development work
Added modification work to existing hardware
Safety and Reliability Assessment Process
♦Primary effort associated with evaluation of postflight 
inspection results (1988 - 2007)
• Screening methodology for items, if left unattended, 
could result in Crit 1
• Item(s) assigned probability and reliability impacts calculated
♦Evaluated hazards impacts based on current Shuttle RSRB 
FMEA hazards
♦Evaluated ground hazards impacts
♦Cursory evaluation of Case III FWC impacts
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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RSRM PFAR
1124
RSRM PRACA
~350
Total number of PFARs 
written against RSRM
PFAR Filtering Methodology
RSRM PFAR Analysis for 
Credible Crit 1 Failure
PRACA closed 
by corrective 
actions -- 96
PRACA that could 
propagate to Crit 1 
failure -- 1
All PFARs are evaluated 
against PRACA reporting 
criteria as defined in NSTS 
08126.  PFARs that meet the 
PRACA criteria are 
considered to be more critical
PRACA reports are basically 
closed in one of two ways
1. Closed by Explanation: 
The item is understood to 
have No Significant Change
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    
in Risk to flight
2. Closed by Corrective 
Action:  The risk level 
warrants a change to the 
hardware and/or process
PRACA closed by corrective 
action evaluated for worst 
credible case condition which 
would result in a catastrophic 
failure of flight hardware
ATK RSRM PFAR (Post Flight Inspection)
ATK RSRM PFAR's per Flight
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RSRM PFAR Causes by Category
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The reliability decrease with an expendable design (due to loss of 
post-flight data) was assessed to be between
6.5 and 13 percent. 
Performance Results
♦Performance (Delta payload to LEO)
• Ares I
− Case I = 2,100 lbm (delta max Q = +21 psf)
C II 0 d 1 600 lb (d lt Q 16 f)− ase  =  an  ,  m e a max  = +  ps
− Case III = 5,550 lbm (delta max Q = +56 psf)
− Additional performance potential with MEOP increase from 1016 psi to 
1066 psi
•Addition of 2,010 lbm for Cases I, II, III (delta max Q = 136 psf)
• Ares V
− Case I = 2,725 lbm (delta max Q = +6 psf)
− Case III = 9,700 lbm (delta max Q = +20 psf)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
− Additional performance potential with MEOP increase from 1016 psi to 
1066 psi
•Addition of 6,380 lbm for Cases I and III (delta max Q = +70 psf)
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Conclusions
♦ It is not Life Cycle Cost effective to adopt expendable over reusable 
Ares I FS and Ares V Boosters
♦ The need for performance drives this solution (if required).
♦ If performance remains an issue for Ares I and V then expendability         ,   
provides measurable performance benefits but at significant cost
• 1,600 to 5,500 lbm for Ares I
• 2,725 to 9700 lbm for Ares V
♦ The effect of the absence of post flight inspection does not drive this 
decision, however, it will have a small affect on FS reliability
• Assessment is subjective in evaluating Crit. 1 propagation and does not include 
combination interactions
♦ With an expendable solution it is desirable to re-examine:
Increased manufacturing and operations inspection and surveillance material
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
•       ,  
finger printing, etc 
• Increased numbers and extremes on static testing
♦ The Team has completed the objective to evaluate the life cycle cost 
of expendable vs. reuse of the Ares I First Stage and Ares V Solid 
Rocket Boosters
Questions
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